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Abstract
We propose a new method for analysing multiperiod stress scenarios for portfolio credit 
risk more systematically than in the current practice of macro stress testing. Our method 
quantifi es the plausibility of scenarios by considering the distance of the stress scenario from 
an average scenario. For a given level of plausibility our method searches systematically for 
the most adverse scenario for the given portfolio. This method therefore gives a formal 
criterion for judging the plausibility of scenarios and it makes sure that no plausible scenario 
will be missed. We show how this method can be applied to a range of models already 
in use among stress testing practitioners. While worst case search requires numerical 
optimisation we show that for practically relevant cases we can work with reasonably good 
linear approximations to the portfolio loss function that make the method computationally 
very effi cient and easy to implement. Applying our approach to data from the Spanish loan 
register and using a portfolio credit risk model we show that, compared to standard stress 
test procedures, our method identifi es more harmful scenarios that are equally plausible.
Keywords: Stress Testing, Credit Risk, Worst Case Search, Maximum Loss.
JEL classifi cation: G28, G32, G20, C15.
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1 Introduction
When supervisory authorities or financial institutions are asked to produce stress
tests for particular aggregate or individual portfolios they face a basic challenge:
While scenarios should be extreme they should at the same time also be plaus-
ible. Clearly the more extreme the scenarios which are considered the less
plausible they become: There is a trade off between severity and plausibility of
stress scenarios. Once this trade off has been made and some measure and level
of plausibility have been determined we still have to make sure not to ignore
any severe scenario for a given plausibility. Unfortunately, current stress test
procedures generally use a few hand-picked scenarios. This makes stress testing
subject to considerable arbitrariness. If, for which reason whatsoever, an insti-
tution does not pick the worst scenarios but just some scenarios involving large
risk factor moves it might get or give an illusion of safety. There is, therefore,
a real danger that ‘stress testing results will continue to lull users into a false
sense of security’ (Borio and Drehmann [2009]). Furthermore, current stress
test procedures do neither allow for making a trade off between plausibility and
severity in a systematic and transparent way, nor do they lead to direct and
specific suggestions for risk reducing actions.
In this paper we offer a systematic approach to stress testing. We specify
a measure of plausibility based on the Mahalanobis distance of the changes
in a set of factors. In this way, we can control how far we go into the tails
of the risk factor distribution in our search for stress scenarios. All scenarios
above the minimal level of plausibility are considered on an equal footing, all
scenarios under the minimal plausibility level are left out of consideration. This
makes transparent the trade off between plausibility and severity one always
has to make. Then, we determine the worst case by maximising a loss function
among all scenarios above the minimal level of plausibility. If an institution can
take this worst case loss it can be sure to survive any scenario at this level of
plausibility. At the same time our method allows for an analysis of appropriate
risk reducing actions.
While the theory and the concepts of worst case search have already been
developed in a one-period framework by Breuer et al. [2009], the current paper
introduces two major novel contributions. First, we extend the method to a
multi-period setting, in which scenarios are paths of macroeconomic variable
values rather than values at one point in time. Second, we show the practical
usefulness of this approach by means of a meaningful and relevant empirical
application, which makes use of standard data and models already in use by
stress testing practitioners. Given is a portfolio and some statistical model for
the risk factors that influence the values of positions and thus the portfolio
value at a given future time horizon. The uncertainty about the realization
of risk factors is described by a risk factor distribution that is estimated from
historical data. For a loan portfolio these risk factors will include the macroe-
conomic environment (because of its impact on the payment ability and thus
on the solvency of borrowers), market factors like interest rates or exchange
rates but also idiosyncratic factors that influence a borrower’s solvency. We use
loan register data from the central loan register of the Banco de Espan˜a and a
credit risk stress testing model developed by Jime´nez and Menc´ıa [2009]. Sim-
ilar credit risk portfolio models have been used by practitioners in many other
central banks. In fact, portfolio credit risk models with similar characteristics
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1018
have been estimated using data from Canada [Misina et al., 2006], Finland [Vir-
olainen, 2004], Hong Kong [Wong et al., 2008], Italy [Fiori et al., 2007] or the
U.K. [Drehmann, 2005, Drehmann et al., 2006]. An international model can
also be found in Pesaran et al. [2006]. These models follow Wilson [1997a,b]
in trying to model the default frequencies of loans to different economic sectors
as functions of macroeconomic conditions. Compared to the previous literat-
ure, Jime´nez and Menc´ıa [2009] contain two important novel features. First,
they not only consider corporate loans but also loans to households such as
mortgages and consumption loans. Second, they introduce latent factors in or-
der to model the correlations between different types of loans. However, since
the methodology is otherwise consistent with the previous literature, the stress
testing approach that we use can be directly applied to other countries. In this
sense, we demonstrate that the application to real world stress testing problems
is straightforward and does not raise complicated implementation issues.
We believe that our approach is able to address some of the more recent
criticism raised against stress testing. Alfaro and Drehmann [2009], for instance,
criticized the realism of using mainly domestic macroeconomic factors in the
description of stress scenarios. They question the ability to construct plausible
yet severe scenarios and they diagnose a lack of robustness of models during
a crisis. While our method is agnostic with respect to which are the relevant
risk factors, our model shows a way how plausible and severe scenarios can
be constructed. In our example we see that our method of worst case search
applied during the boom year 2006 was clearly superior to historical scenario
stress testing in gauging the subsequent crisis. While we use the historical data
to delineate the plausibility of the stress scenario the worst case looks clearly
different from the historical recession scenario and comes much nearer to the
actual downturn that materialized in 2008. Hence, we show that worst case
search could have generated scenarios as severe as the current crisis based only
on information prior to 2007. Notice, though, that we do not mean to imply
that our model would have predicted the crisis, but rather that its use could
have forewarned practitioners that such an unprecedented scenario could occur
within reasonable levels of plausibility.
Stress testing and risk measurement models have also been criticised for
assuming naively that the risk factor distribution in times of crisis is the same
as always. Here we do not systematically address this robustness issue. New
results by Breuer and Csisza´r [2010] generalize our approach to address this
question. In this more general framework questions of parameter stability and
model risk can be directly analysed.
Alfaro and Drehmann [2009] conclude that the unsatisfactory state of stress
testing models calls for a stronger role of judgement in stress testing. Our
approach is open to this requirement. While Alfaro and Drehmann [2009] want
to more strongly weight judgement with respect to the output of a stress test,
our approach would argue to the contrary that the judgement should enter
more strongly on the the side of the input. We propose to pin down ex ante in
a transparent way the plausibility one is willing to consider and then accept the
result of the stress test. The advantage we see in this approach is that the current
practice and the practice augmented with stronger judgement as suggested in
Alfaro and Drehmann [2009] makes stress testing an exercise extremely prone
to all kinds of manipulation. We believe that our approach is a step towards
manipulation proofness of stress testing. As such our paper contributes not only
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to the methodology of stress testing but has wider implications for the political
economy of stress testing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how the worst case search
can be applied to a set up where risk factor movements are forecasted over
multiple time steps. Section 3 describes our data of the Spanish loan market.
Section 4 describes and discusses our main results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Worst Case Search and Credit Risk
2.1 To which Credit Risk Models Can Worst Case Search
be Applied?
We want to apply the method of worst case search over risk factor domains of
certain plausibility to the analysis of portfolio credit risk. In order to do so we
need to be able at each point in time t to measure the expected loss of position
i in sector k, for k = 1, · · · ,K. We need a model structure that can express
the expected loss as a function of risk factors. Typically these risk factors are
innovations of macroeconomic variables at future times, as well as idiosyncratic
events. We write these categories of risk factors separately as two vectors ui
and v, with v describing the innovations of macroeconomic variables at different
future times.
At a given time t the loss of a position i is given by Li,t(ui,v). In typical
stress tests we are interested in assessing what happens to the portfolio loss
given the path followed by the macroeconomic risk factors. This involves taking
expectations over the idiosyncratic factors. Thus we are interested in the ex-
pected loss at a given time t for a certain horizon (say m periods) given a future
scenario path of macroeconomic risk factors v and the information It available
at t:
E
[
t+m∑
s=t+1
∑
i
Li,s(ui,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ It,v
]
. (1)
In a specific application of course Li,t(ui,v) is determined by the credit risk
model. The main assumption we need for our macroeconomic stress test method
is that the stressed macro risk factors v are elliptically distributed. (The more
general method in Breuer and Csisza´r [2010] works for arbitrary risk factor
distributions.) Let us see how (1) looks like in some familiar credit risk models,
and in the model we use.
Example 1: Gaussian Single Factor Model This model, which was de-
veloped by Vasicek [1987], Finger [1999] and Gordy [2003] among others, approx-
imates the loss distribution of a credit portfolio in which dependence between
defaults is driven by a single common latent factor. The default of an obligor i
from the class k(i) is driven by an auxiliary stochastic variable zi,t. This variable
is parametrized as
zi,t = βkvt +
√
1− β2kui,t, (2)
where vt represents a latent macroeconomic factor, ui,t is an independent idio-
syncratic risk term and βk ∈ (−1, 1) captures the sensitivity of zi,t to the mac-
roeconomic factor. Both vt and ui,t are modeled as standard normal variates
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so that zi,t is also standard normal. The intuition behind this approach is that
zi,t reflects the value of the firm. The obligor defaults when this value decreases
below a given boundary ψi. Hence, the loss function can be expressed as
Li,t(ui,t, vt) = 1(zi,t < ψi)LGDiEADi, (3)
where 1(·) is the usual indicator function, while the loss given default (LGDi)
and the exposure at default (EADi) are assumed to be known non-stochastic
quantities. Assuming that default rates are homogeneous in each rating class
(same βk and ψi for obligors i in the same class k(i)) the expected loss (1)
becomes
t+m∑
s=t+1
∑
i
Φ
(
ψi − βkvs√
1− β2k
)
LGDiEADi, (4)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).
The assumption of homogeneous default rates within classes can be easily re-
laxed.
Example 2: Firm Value Model This model, due to Merton [1974], uses
option pricing theory to value debt. Although it was originally developed in
continuous time, we will use its discretized version to remain consistent with
the rest of the paper. Consider a firm i whose assets are worth Ai,t at t. In
this simple context, firms issue debt as zero-coupon bonds with face values Di
and maturities at t+m. Due to limited liability, the equity owners of each firm
will pay Di only if the value of the firm at maturity is greater than its debt, i.e.
Ai,t+m > Di. In any other case, the lender will obtain the residual value of the
firm at maturity. Hence, the loss at t + m can be expressed as
Li,t+m(Ai,t+m) = max{Di −Ai,t+m, 0}
= max{Ai,t+m −Di, 0} − (Ai,t+m −Di)
Notice that the evolution of the firms’ asset values from t to t+m may depend on
a set of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks that occur during this period.
Hence, the expected loss (1) given It and a scenario path of macroeconomic
shocks v = (v′t+1, · · · ,v′t+m)′ can be expressed as
E[Li,t+m(Ai,t+m)|It,v] = ct(t + m,Di,v)
−E[Ai,t+m|It,v] + Di,
where ct(t + m,Di,v) denotes the price at t of a European call option on the
firm’s asset value with strike Di and expiration at t + m, given It and the
evolution of the macroeconomic factors. This price will correspond to the well
known formula of Black and Scholes [1973] if the firms’ values are modeled as
geometric Brownian motions.
The Jime´nez-Menc´ıa Model In our application we use a version of the
credit risk model developed by Jime´nez and Menc´ıa [2009]. In line with similar
models that have been developed in other central banks, this model is a mul-
tifactor extension of Example 1 that allows for several macroeconomic factors
to affect the loss distribution. In addition, it introduces time series dynamics
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to capture the high persistence of actual default rates, see Fig. 3. The model
addresses only credit risk of domestic loan portfolios. Other possible sources
of bank crises such as shocks to foreign assets or liquidity problems are not
modelled.
The loan portfolio is partitioned into K sectors. The losses due to loan i
from sector k are decomposed in any period t as
Li,t = Di,t · LGDk · EADi (5)
if LGD are homogeneous within sectors. In this equation Di,t is a default
indicator. It is a binary variable that equals 1 in case of default and 0 otherwise.
EADi is the exposure of obligor i at default.
We assume that the probability of default is homogeneous within each sector
and write it as
Pr(Di,t = 1) = πk,t. (6)
We describe this variable with a probit model
πk,t = Φ(zk,t), (7)
where
zk,t = αk + ρkzk,t−1 +
q∑
j=1
γk,j ·Δxt−j + βkft + uk,t, (8)
Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution, Δxt = xt −xt−1 is a vector
of quarterly changes in (observable) macroeconomic variables, ft is a common
latent factor and ukt is an idiosyncratic error term for sector k. This probit
model can be justified by applying to the same arguments as in the single factor
model of Example 1. This is why the probability of default can be expressed as
a standard normal cdf transform of a Gaussian variable in both cases. However,
we introduce time series dynamics in (8) and allow for more than one factor.
Furthermore, the macrovariables follow a diagonal AR(1) process
Δxt = A0 + A1Δxt−1 + vt (9)
with
A0 =
[
a01
a02
]
(10)
and
A1 =
[
a11 0
0 a12
]
(11)
The error terms vt ∼ iid N(0,Σ), ft ∼ iid N(0, 1) and uk,t ∼ iid N(0, σ2k) are
mutually independent.
As risk factors we use the path of the macroeconomic residuals v = (vt+1,
vt+2, · · · ,vt+m) for an m period stress testing analysis. By (9) the v determine
the macrovariables x, and vice versa. The risk factors, over which the objective
function takes expectations, are uk,t and ft in (8). So far the general structure
of the model.
In our implementation, we take as macrovariables xt the quarterly changes
in GDP and the real interest rate r such that
xt =
[
(GDPt/GDPt−4)− 1
rt
]
. (12)
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The information It prevailing at time t includes current and past values of the
macro variables (xt,xt−1, . . .) as well as (zk,t, zk,t−1, . . .) for all k.
We use the second, third and fourth lags in (8), which seem to be the most
significant ones in our application. So γk,j = 0 for j = 1 and j > 4. With
this lag-structure the macro factors at time t influence the expected loss only
in periods t + 2, t + 3 and t + 4.
The parameters in (8) and (9) can be estimated separately, since they are
Gaussian conditionally independent vector autoregressive models.
2.2 Worst Case Search on a Plausible Domain
In our model the risk factors of interest affecting the expected value of the credit
portfolio at a future time horizon t+m are the path of macroeconomic shocks,
denoted by v. These paths describe our scenarios. We compute the expected
loss with respect to all other risk factors. The maximum loss over a given set
of scenarios S is given by
MaxLossS(L) := max
v∈S
E
[
t+m∑
s=t+1
∑
i
Li,t(ui,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ It,v
]
, (13)
Maximum loss is a coherent risk measure (Artzner et al. [1999]) for any given
feasible risk factor region S.
The choice of the region S leads to our concept of plausibility. We define
plausibility as a probabilistic concept: The higher the probability to move to a
scenario v, the higher is its plausibility. This implies that scenarios which are
more distant from the expected value of the current scenario, μ = E(v), will
be less plausible. And scenarios which involve a move against the prevailing
correlations, Σ = cov(v), will be less plausible than scenarios involving a move
along with the correlations.
The Mahalanobis distance of v from μ is defined as
Maha(v) :=
√
(μ− v)TΣ−1(μ− v) (14)
The method can be applied if the second moments of the distribution of v
are finite. In case the distribution of v is elliptical the level surfaces of the
density function are ellipsoids with constant Mahalanobis distance.1 Hence, all
the realisations of v with the same Mahalanobis distance are equally likely or
equally plausible under ellipticity. Hence, we propose to take as trust regions
the ellipsoid of some given Mahalanobis radius τ :
Ellτ := {v : Maha(v) ≤ τ} (15)
τ is proportional to the lengths of the main axes of the ellipsoid. For an intuitive
interpretation of τ , note that Ellτ contains only (but not all) moves in which all
risk factors move τ standard deviations or less. Hence, the higher the value of
τ the less plausible the scenarios will be.
1Formally, v is elliptical if it can be expressed as the location-scale transform v = μ+Σ1/2y
of a spherical random vector y. y in turn is said to have a spherical distribution if its
characteristic function ψy (t) = E[exp(it′y)] can be expressed as a function of the norm of t,
that is, ψy (t) = φ(t′t). See Fang et al. [1987] for more details.
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2.3 Methods to Identify Worst Case Scenarios
Identifying the scenario in the ellipsoid Ellτ which leads to the maximum loss is
a non-linear optimization problem, which can be computationally demanding.
An explicit evaluation of the expected loss requires the computation of a high
dimensional Gaussian cdf Φ, which is expensive in terms of CPU time.
As Method 1 we used a Monte Carlo algorithm working in a series of focus-
ation steps on the surface of the ellipsoid, as described in Pistovcˇa´k and Breuer
[2004]. We used 20 focusation steps with 60 evaluations of the objective function
in each step. Worst case search with this approach may be quite slow, since the
the maximisation algorithm requires the evaluation of the objective function at
1200 different points.
Method 2 is based on a linear approximation of the loss function. If the loss
function were linear, l· (μ−v), and if the risk factor distribution is a multivariate
normal, v ∼ N(μ,Σ), the worst case scenario could be calculated analytically
by
μ = μ− τ√
lTΣl
Σl. (16)
This is illustrated in Figure 1. From (16) we can see that in the case of a linear
loss function the worst case is linear in τ .
v1
v2
l
μ
_

Σ l
Ellk
Figure 1: Analytic calculation of the worst case scenario μ for a linear portfolio.
We can compute the value of the objective function (1), resulting from the
credit risk model of Jime´nez and Menc´ıa [2009], in closed form. This function
is not linear, as the plot in Fig. 2 shows.
Method 2 takes as worst case scenario the worst case scenario (16) of the
linear approximation, and then calculates the expected loss in this worst case
scenario from the full evaluation of the closed form expected loss. For a path
of length m = 6 quarters with 2 risk factors for each quarter, we have a total
of 12 risk factors, so the calculation of the linear approximation l requires 13
evaluations of the objective function. This is by a factor of almost 100 less
than what we used for Method 1. Another possible method of worst case search
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Figure 2: Cumulated expected loss of the portfolio and its linear approximation in the
direction of the gradient.
would be to take the worst case scenario of the linear approximation as starting
point of the focused Monte Carlo search.
3 The Data
As our database we use quarterly series of sectoral default frequencies pk,t from
1984.Q1 to 2006.Q4 from the Spanish central credit register. This credit register
contains information about all the loans with volumes higher than e6,000. Since
this threshold is very small, we can safely assume that we are modeling the whole
Spanish credit market. We organize the Spanish loan market in its K = 12 main
sectors. LGDs and weights of the sectors are given in Table 1. These values are
consistent with the results of the Fifth Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS5) for
the Spanish banking system. We use the actual exposures at default for each
loan.
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k Sector LGD weight [%]
1 Agriculture 0.35 0.99
2 Mining 0.35 0.17
3 Manufacture 0.35 6.25
4 Utilities 0.35 1.53
5 Construction 0.35 25.48
6 Commerces 0.35 4.36
7 Hotels 0.35 1.63
8 Communications 0.35 2.40
9 R&D 0.35 4.54
10 Other corporate 0.35 2.13
11 Mortgages 0.15 37.05
12 Consumption loans 0.25 13.45
Table 1: Sectors of the Spanish loan market
Mean (%) Std. Dev (%) Autocorrelation
Agriculture 1.06 0.68 0.97
Mining 0.91 0.62 0.93
Manufacture 0.79 0.52 0.96
Utilities 0.55 0.30 0.85
Construction 1.40 1.14 0.98
Commerce 0.79 0.54 0.97
Hotels 1.49 1.07 0.97
Communications 0.91 0.64 0.98
R&D 0.85 0.60 0.97
Other corporate 1.11 0.74 0.98
Mortgages 0.52 0.46 0.97
Consumption loans 0.66 0.37 0.97
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sectoral default rates
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Table 3: Parameter estimates for evolution (8) of endogenous variables zk in sectors k.
∗ indicates significance at the 90% level, while ∗∗ denotes
significance at the 95% level.
k αk ρk γk,2 γk,3 γk,4 βk σk
GDP IR GDP IR GDP IR
1 -7.90 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ -1.25 ∗∗ -0.86 -0.73 1.78 ∗∗ -0.38 -1.31 ∗∗ 3.92 ∗∗ 7.92 ∗∗
2 -12.95 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ -1.51 ∗ -0.86 -1.00 1.34 0.75 -1.77 ∗ 4.57 ∗∗ 42.22 ∗∗
3 -8.92 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ -1.79 ∗∗ -0.34 -1.31 ∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗ -0.45 -1.06 ∗∗ 3.79 ∗∗ 4.34 ∗∗
4 -28.34 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ -1.03 -0.09 0.20 1.25 -0.18 -1.03 4.70 ∗∗ 65.67 ∗∗
5 -3.30 0.99 ∗∗ -1.15 ∗∗ 0.38 -0.90 ∗ 0.74 -0.82 ∗ -0.05 3.28 ∗∗ 6.36 ∗∗
6 -6.47 ∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ -1.34 ∗∗ -0.48 -0.90 ∗∗ 1.14 ∗∗ -0.39 -0.54 3.29 ∗∗ 1.82 ∗∗
7 -11.76 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ -1.51 ∗∗ -0.27 -0.57 1.92 ∗∗ -0.12 -1.06 3.80 ∗∗ 17.86 ∗∗
8 -10.19 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ -1.09 ∗∗ -0.24 -0.96 ∗∗ 1.29 ∗∗ -0.79 ∗ -0.90 ∗ 3.30 ∗∗ 7.42 ∗∗
9 -9.63 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ -0.32 -0.15 -1.34 ∗∗ 0.34 -1.56 ∗∗ -0.68 2.87 ∗∗ 14.05 ∗∗
10 -4.01 0.98 ∗∗ -0.24 0.55 -0.95 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗ -0.23 -0.64 2.95 ∗∗ 8.97 ∗∗
11 -8.07 ∗ 0.97 ∗∗ -1.06 ∗ 0.19 -1.87 ∗∗ 0.57 -1.39 ∗∗ 0.49 2.30 ∗∗ 25.64 ∗∗
12 -3.77 ∗ 0.98 ∗∗ -0.96 ∗∗ -0.18 -0.92 ∗∗ 0.49 -0.64 ∗∗ -0.45 2.06 ∗∗ 5.24 ∗∗
A0 A1 Ω
0.02 -0.43∗∗ 0.00 1.13∗∗ -0.23∗
0.03 0.00 0.38∗∗ -0.23∗ 1.18∗∗
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the diagonal AR(1) process of macrovariables (9).
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It can be shown that default frequencies (pk,t) asymptotically tend to default
probabilities (πk,t) as the number of loans grows to infinity. Due to the large
number of loans per sector in our application, we can safely use pk,t as a proxy of
πk,t. As Fig. 3 shows, probabilities of default are far from being iid as the tradi-
tional single factor models assumes. These series tend to be very persistent and
highly sensitive to the macroeconomic situation. Not surprisingly, the highest
probabilities of default over the sample period are observed during the Spanish
recession in 1992-1993. Table 2, which shows the main descriptive statistics of
the default frequencies, confirm the high persistence of these series. In order
to take into account these features, we consider the multifactor probit model of
Jime´nez and Menc´ıa to explain the evolution of the probabilities of default as
a function of GDP growth and interest rate changes, as well as an additional
common latent factor and sector idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, GDP and interest
rates capture the sensitivity of the probabilities of default to macroeconomic
shocks, while the remaining latent factors capture residual risk, either common
or idiosyncratic. Our estimates, shown in Tables 3 and 4, indicate that default
rates increase when either GDP growth falls or interest rates rise.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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Figure 3: Historical default frequencies in the Spanish economy
4 Results
In this section we compare stress testing results from traditional approaches
(synthetic standard scenario, historical stress scenario) to worst case scenarios.
We consider two stress scenarios consisting of six time steps of three months
each. Expected losses are aggregated over eight periods. Because expected
losses do not depend on the present value and the first lag of the macroeconomic
variables (γ0 = γ1 = 0), the expected losses of the first two periods are already
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GDP −3σ WCS Method 1 WCS Method 2
EL increase 18.11% 28.31% 29.64%
GDP: Q1 -3.00 -1.79 -1.87
GDP: Q2 0.00 -0.85 -0.73
GDP: Q3 0.00 -0.75 -0.85
GDP: Q4 0.00 -0.53 -0.49
GDP: Q5 0.00 -0.14 -0.27
GDP: Q6 0.00 -0.18 -0.07
IR: Q1 0.00 1.56 1.54
IR: Q2 0.00 1.17 1.55
IR: Q3 0.00 1.05 1.37
IR: Q4 0.00 0.84 1.08
IR: Q5 0.00 1.01 0.73
IR: Q6 0.00 0.64 0.35
Table 5: -3σ drop in GDP versus worst case at the same level of plausibility.
Risk factor changes given in standard deviations. Plausibility level τ = 3.34.
determined by the past values of the macro variables. Expected losses in periods
7 and 8 are determined by the macro variable values of the six-period scenarios.
4.1 Worst Case Search Versus a Single Extreme Drop in
GDP
The first standard stress scenario is a synthetic one-step scenario, in which
GDP growth decreases by three standard deviations from its mean in the first
quarter and returns to its mean during the next quarters. There are no further
shocks to GDP growth innovations from quarter 2 onwards until the analysis
horizon of m = 8 quarters. Innovations to interest rates are not shocked either.
The plausibility of this scenario can be quantified by a Maha of 3.34. If we
take at the same level of plausibility the worst case for the given loan portfolio
we see that expected loss increases considerably more than the naive stress
test would suggest. While the three standard deviations GDP drop scenario
increases expected loss by 18.1%, in the worst case we get an (approximate)
increase by 29.6%.
The worst case search reveals that for the given portfolio the worst case
differs from the one-period GDP scenario in two important points. First, a
simultaneous increase in interest rates amplifies the effects of the GDP drop.
The economic reason is that higher interest rates increase the payment obligation
of borrowers, which in turn leads to an increase in defaults. The fact that the
scenarios really harmful to a loan portfolio involve not just GDP drops but
other risk factors as well is in line with the findings of Alfaro and Drehmann
[2009] that loan losses caused only by a GDP drop are not able to replicate the
dynamics of many past banking crises, and that other risk factors should also
play a role. The naive stress test not only underestimate the expected portfolio
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loss but it also neglects a decisive risk factor. Second, the worst case scenario has
a slightly less dramatic drop in GDP in the first quarter but further drops in the
following quarters. This shows that the multi-period set-up is indeed relevant to
understand the dynamics of severe crises. Due to the high persistence of actual
default rates and the autoregressive properties of macroeconomic time series a
severe crisis is not a one-shot event but unfolds in a number of time steps.
A meaningful stress test needs to be portfolio specific. Different portfolios
may show different sensitivity to different risk factors. Macro scenarios that
might as such sound very dramatic may for certain portfolios even have a bene-
ficial effect in terms of expected loss. Worst case search takes portfolio specificity
fully into account and reveals the decisive risk factors.
Method 2 identifies a slightly more harmful worst case scenario than Method
1 despite the higher computational expenses of the first method.
4.2 Worst Case Search Versus Extreme Historical Episode
Historical stress scenarios have the advantage of naturally involving more than
one risk factor and more than one time step. Therefore historical scenarios
are a popular choice for stress tests. In the following we compare the analysis
of a historical episode, the 1992 recession in Spain, to the worst case of the
same plausibility. GDP and the interest rate repeat the relative changes of the
Spanish crisis from 1992.Q3 to 1993.Q4. The macroeconomic time series with
the 1992 crisis and its revival in 2007 are shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Historical scenario: Revival of the 1992 crisis in 2007.
The plausibility of this scenario can be quantified by a Maha of 5.63. This is
more extreme than the scenario described by the previous example. Table 6 gives
the results of the worst case search. This time method 2 identifies a scenario
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92 crisis revival WCS Method 1 WCS Method 2
EL increase 27.53% 55.13% 56.91%
GDP: Q1 -2.58 -3.19 -3.19
GDP: Q2 -0.69 -1.28 -1.17
GDP: Q3 -1.15 -1.45 -1.43
GDP: Q4 -1.89 -0.80 -0.82
GDP: Q5 1.28 -0.33 -0.49
GDP: Q6 1.12 -0.23 -0.13
IR: Q1 -0.79 2.10 2.23
IR: Q2 1.86 1.86 2.53
IR: Q3 1.50 1.92 2.30
IR: Q4 -0.07 1.40 1.84
IR: Q5 -2.78 1.67 1.23
IR: Q6 -1.41 0.81 0.55
Table 6: 1992 crisis versus worst case at the same level of plausibility. Risk
factor changes given in standard deviations. Plausibility level τ = 5.63.
with higher expected losses than Method 1. Apparently the optimization errors
involved in Method 1 are worse than the approximation errors of Method 2.
The worst case at the same level of plausibility is an expected loss increase of
56.9% instead of the 27.5% increase produced by the historical scenario. There
are two main reasons for the difference. First, the worst case scenario involves
a rise in interest rates persisting over the full eight quarters of our analysis,
whereas the historical scenario involves a clear rise of interest rates only in the
second and third quarter. Second, the historical scenario involves a sharp drop
in GDP and a subsequent rise, whereas in the worst case the GDP drop is less
sharp but persists for a longer time.
This reflects a well-known problem of stress tests with historical scenarios.
Risk factor movements in a historical crisis are just one possible course of events.
Other scenarios might be equally plausible but much more harmful for the port-
folio. The next crisis need not be, and probably will not be, exactly like a past
crisis. ‘History doesn’t repeat itself, at best rhymes sometimes’, is a saying
attributed to Mark Twain. Using worst case search we can be sure that at
the chosen level of plausibility we have indeed captured the most detrimental
scenario, irrespective of whether or not it happened in history.
The stress tests were performed from the point of view as of January 2007,
using only data up to December 2006. At that time the Spanish economy
was in its heyday with no sign of the 2008/09 crisis. The stress scenarios can
be compared to what happened in reality after January 2007, see Fig. 5. The
scenario realised from 2007.Q1 to 2008.Q2 has a Maha of 2.03, and it produces a
3.37% increase of expected loss according to our model. So the realised scenario
is more plausible and less harmful than both the 1992 crisis revival and the
worst case scenario.
How well does our method gauge the economic crisis of 2008-09, of which
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Figure 5: Comparison of the 1992 Crisis revival, the worst case scenario of the same
plausibility, and the realised scenario.
there was no indication at the time the stress tests were performed? Fig. 5
also shows that the crisis did not hit Spanish GDP until Summer 2008. The
scenario realised from 2008.Q1 until 2009.Q3 displays a similar GDP evolution
as the worst case scenario envisaged in January 2007. It has plausibility of
4.88 and model-implied expected loss increase of 47%. This scenario is almost
as extreme as the worst case scenario at τ = 5.62 from the point of view of
January 2007, and it leads to a comparable increase in expected loss (47% vs.
56%) The worst case scenario determined with our method with data up to
January 2007 gives a reasonable good gauge of the crisis to come.
Knowledge of the worst case scenario suggests risk reducing actions. The
characteristic risk factor movements in the worst case scenarios are a drop in
GDP and simultaneous increase in interest rates. An institution wishing to
reduce loss in the worst case scenarios will take positions which are profitable
under the worst case moves of the risk factors. For example, it might buy options
paying off in case of interest rate increases. But there are two caveats: First,
one must not overlook the default risk of the option writer. If the option writer
is exposed to similar risk as the institution seeking to insure losses, he might
default when the insurance taker needs him most. Second, some risk factors, as
for example GDP, are hard to insure on a large scale. Probably it is difficult to
find a counterparty willing and able to pay amounts comparable to the losses
of the Spanish loan portfolio in case of a GDP drop.
Alternatively, institutions might try to reduce their exposures to those sec-
tors that are more sensitive to the worst case scenario. In this sense, Table 7
shows that some sectors, such as Mining and Utilities, remain largely unaffected
by worst case scenario. (These sectors have their own worst case scenarios, but
these are very different from the economy’s worst case scenario.) In contrast,
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Sector WCS Method 1 WCS Method 2
Agriculture 31.27 30.10
Mining 7.88 6.13
Manufacture 59.17 58.45
Utilities 7.71 7.85
Construction 67.88 71.83
Commerce 43.79 43.83
Hotels 39.76 41.49
Communication 45.88 46.28
R&D 34.03 32.20
Other Corporate 38.44 41.42
Mortgages 97.71 102.21
Consumption loans 35.26 34.50
Total 55.13 56.91
Table 7: Sectoral changes of expected losses in the worst case (%). Plausib-
ility level τ = 5.63.
the sectors Construction and Mortgages yield the highest changes in expected
losses. These are the sectors suffering particularly hard in the worst case scen-
ario of the economy. (The worst case scenarios of these sectors are similar to the
economy’s worst case scenario.) Hence, institutions may either reduce the risks
of their loan portfolios by avoiding an excessive concentration on the riskiest
types of loans, or adjust their levels of capital in order to cover the potential
losses in the worst case scenario.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a systematic approach to multi-period macro stress
tests of loan portfolios. We have shown that the requirements of using scenarios
that are extreme yet plausible can be made precise: We define plausibility as the
number of (multivariate) standard deviations the stress scenario is away from
an average scenario. In this region of plausibility the worst case for the portfolio
analysed can be determined by maximizing expected loss.
Compared to standard ways of constructing scenarios in stress testing by
thought experiments or historical reference scenarios this approach has several
advantages. First it makes transparent the plausibility of the scenario con-
sidered. Second, it makes sure that in the context of the model one finds indeed
the most adverse scenario for the given portfolio and that we do not forget a
detrimental scenario at a given level of plausibility. Third because the method
takes into account the portfolio specificity of the worst case scenario it imme-
diately suggests risk reducing actions and therefore gives a clear picture of the
risk situation. Furthermore we see in our example that when applied to data
up to December 2006, which does not include information from the crisis, our
method outperforms traditional approaches in gauging the recent crisis. From a
practical perspective, we propose a linear approximation to compute the worst
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case scenario analytically. This linearisation does not only work extremely well
in terms of accuracy, but it also substantially reduces the CPU time required
by the full blown worst case search.
To add the method to the existing arsenal of stress testing methods is easy
because it is compatible with many models of portfolio credit risk used among
stress testing practitioners. It is thus compatible with stress testing technology
already in place. In many cases a linear approximation of expected loss will
be reasonably accurate. In these cases worst case search is very fast and com-
putationally highly efficient. But our method has another advantage in terms
of the political economy of stress testing. By making stress scenario construc-
tion systematic and by entering the major input of judgment to the question of
determining plausibility of stress scenarios our approach is more manipulation
proof than traditional procedures. We believe that this aspect is practically of
high relevance and importance if stress testing should be credible and useful.
We hope that these conceptual advantages in combination with the straight-
forward and efficient way in which the method can be applied might persuade
some practitioners of stress testing to add worst case search to their method-
ological arsenal and support the profession in the search of a more systematic
approach to the construction of stress scenarios.
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